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inference based

  • 1 на основе логического вывода

    Русско-английский словарь по нефти и газу > на основе логического вывода

  • 2 проблема логического вывода

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > проблема логического вывода

  • 3 алгоритм основанный на логическом выводе

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > алгоритм основанный на логическом выводе

  • 4 грамматический вывод

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > грамматический вывод

  • 5 дедуктивный вывод

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > дедуктивный вывод

  • 6 индуктивный вывод

    1. inductive inference
    2. bottom-up reasoning

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > индуктивный вывод

  • 7 механизмы вывода

    1. inference machinery
    2. output mechanism

    выходное устройство; устройство вывода — output device

    программа вывода; выходная программа — output routine

    механизм вывода; устройство вывода — output mechanism

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > механизмы вывода

  • 8 совместные выводы

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > совместные выводы

  • 9 формальный вывод

    Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > формальный вывод

  • 10 пропозиционный вывод

    Русско-английский научный словарь > пропозиционный вывод

  • 11 алгоритм, основанный на логическом выводе

    Information technology: inference-based algorithm

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > алгоритм, основанный на логическом выводе

  • 12 भूयस् _bhūyas

    भूयस् a. (
    -सी f.) [अतिशयेन बहु ईयसुन्]
    1 More, more numerous or abundant.
    -2 Greater, larger; तद्दर्शनाद- भूच्छंभोर्भूयान् दारार्थमादरः Ku.6.13.
    -3 More important.
    -4 Very great or large, much, many, numerous; भवति च पुनर्भूयान् भेदः फलं प्रति तद्यथा U.2.4; भद्रं भद्रं वितर भगवन् भूयसे मङ्गलाय Māl.1.3; U.3.48; R.17.41; U.2.3.
    -5 Rich or abounding in; एवंप्रायगुणभूयसीं स्वकृतिम् Māl.1.
    -6 Vehement, severe. -ind.
    1 Much, very much, exceedingly, largely, greatly.
    -2 More, again, further more, moreover; पाथेयमुत्सृज बिसं ग्रहणाय भूयः V.4.15; R.2.46; भूयश्चाह त्वमसि शयने कण्ठलग्ना पुरा मे Me.113.
    -3 Repeatedly, frequently; पूर्वं भूयः first, in the first place --next, in the next place. (The form भूयसा is often used adverbially in the sense of
    1 very much, in a high degree, exceedingly, beyond measure, for the greater part; न खरो न च भूयसा मृदुः R.8.9; कुसुमपुरभुवो भूयसा दुःखयन्ति Mu.6.9; पश्चार्धेन प्रविष्टः शरपतनभयाद् भूयसा पूर्व- कायम् Ś1.7.
    -2 generally, as a general rule; भूयसा जीविधर्म एषः U.5).
    -Comp. -कर a. augmenting, increa- sing.
    -काम a. very desirous of anything.
    -दर्शनम् 1 frequent observation; भूयोभूयोदर्शनेन यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्नि- रिति व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा T. S.
    -2 an inference based on frequent and wide observation.
    -भावः increase, growth, progress.
    -भूयस् ind. again and again, repeatedly; भूयोभूयः सविध- नगरीरथ्यया पर्यटन्तम् Māl.1.15.
    -मात्रम् the greatest part, most of.
    -विद्य a.
    1 more learned.
    -2 very learned.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > भूयस् _bhūyas

  • 13 अर्थः _arthḥ

    अर्थः [In some of its senses from अर्थ्; in others from ऋ-थन् Uṇ.2.4; अर्थते ह्यसौ अर्थिभिः Nir.]
    1 Object, pur- pose, end and aim; wish, desire; ज्ञातार्थो ज्ञातसंबन्धः श्रोतुं श्रोता प्रवर्तते, सिद्ध˚, ˚परिपन्थी Mu.5; ˚वशात् 5.8; स्मर्तव्यो$स्मि सत्यर्थे Dk.117 if it be necessary; Y.2.46; M.4.6; oft. used in this sense as the last member of compounds and translated by 'for', 'intended for', 'for the sake of', 'on account of', 'on behalf of', and used like an adj. to qualify nouns; अर्थेन तु नित्य- समासो विशेष्यनिघ्रता च Vārt.; सन्तानार्थाय विधये R.1.34; तां देवतापित्रतिथिक्रियार्थाम् (धेनुम्) 2.16; द्विजार्था यवागूः Sk.; यज्ञार्थात्कर्मणो$न्यत्र Bg.3.9. It mostly occurs in this sense as अर्थम्, अर्थे or अर्थाय and has an adverbial force; (a) किमर्थम् for what purpose, why; यदर्थम् for whom or which; वेलोपलक्षणार्थम् Ś.4; तद्दर्शनादभूच्छम्भोर्भूयान्दारार्थ- मादरः Ku.6.13; (b) परार्थे प्राज्ञ उत्सृजेत् H.1.41; गवार्थे ब्राह्मणार्थे च Pt.1.42; मदर्थे त्यक्तजीविताः Bg.1.9; (c) सुखार्थाय Pt.4.18; प्रत्याख्याता मया तत्र नलस्यार्थाय देवताः Nala.13.19; ऋतुपर्णस्य चार्थाय 23.9.
    -2 Cause, motive, reason, ground, means; अलुप्तश्च मुनेः क्रियार्थः R. 2.55 means or cause; अतो$र्थात् Ms.2.213.
    -3 Meaning, sense, signification, import; अर्थ is of 3 kinds:-- वाच्य or expressed, लक्ष्य or indicated (secondary), and व्यङ्ग्य or suggested; तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ K. P.1; अर्थो वाच्यश्च लक्ष्यश्च व्यङ्ग्यश्चेति त्रिधा मतः S. D.2; वागर्थाविव R.1.1; अवेक्ष्य धातोर्गमनार्थमर्थवित् 3.21.
    -4 A thing, object, substance; लक्ष्मणो$र्थं ततः श्रुत्वा Rām.7.46.18; अर्थो हि कन्या परकीय एव Ś.4.22; that which can be perceived by the senses, an object of sense; इन्द्रिय˚ H.1.146; Ku.7.71; R.2.51; न निर्बद्धा उपसर्गा अर्थान्निराहुः Nir.; इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः Kaṭh. (the objects of sense are five: रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द); शब्दः स्पर्शो रसो गन्धो रूपं चेत्यर्थजातयः Bhāg.11.22.16.
    -5 (a) An affair, business, matter, work; प्राक् प्रतिपन्नो$यमर्थो$- ङ्गराजाय Ve.3; अर्थो$यमर्थान्तरभाव्य एव Ku.3.18; अर्थो$र्था- नुबन्धी Dk.67; सङ्गीतार्थः Me.66 business of singing i. e. musical concert (apparatus of singing); सन्देशार्थाः Me. 5 matters of message, i. e. messages; (b) Interest, object; स्वार्थसाधनतत्परः Ms.4.196; द्वयमेवार्थसाधनम् R.1. 19;2.21; दुरापे$र्थे 1.72; सर्वार्थचिन्तकः Ms.7.121; माल- विकायां न मे कश्चिदर्थः M.3 I have no interest in M. (c) Subject-matter, contents (as of letters &c.); त्वामव- गतार्थं करिष्यति Mu.1 will acquaint you with the matter; उत्तरो$यं लेखार्थः ibid.; तेन हि अस्य गृहीतार्था भवामि V.2 if so I should know its contents; ननु परिगृहीतार्थो$- स्मि कृतो भवता V.5; तया भवतो$विनयमन्तरेण परिगृहीतार्था कृता देवी M.4 made acquainted with; त्वया गृहीतार्थया अत्रभवती कथं न वारिता 3; अगृहीतार्थे आवाम् Ś.6; इति पौरान् गृहीतार्थान् कृत्वा ibid.
    -6 Wealth, riches, property, money (said to be of 3 kinds: शुक्ल honestly got; शबल got by more or less doubtful means, and कृष्ण dishonestly got;) त्यागाय संभृतार्थानाम् R.1.7; धिगर्थाः कष्टसंश्रयाः Pt.1.163; अर्थानामर्जने दुःखम् ibid.; सस्यार्थास्तस्य मित्राणि1.3; तेषामर्थे नियुञ्जीत शूरान् दक्षान् कुलोद्गतान् Ms.7.62.
    -7 Attainment of riches or worldly prosperity, regarded as one of the four ends of human existence, the other three being धर्म, काम and मोक्ष; with अर्थ and काम, धर्म forms the well-known triad; cf. Ku.5.38; अप्यर्थकामौ तस्यास्तां धर्म एव मनीषिणः R.1.25.
    -8 (a) Use, advantage, profit, good; तथा हि सर्वे तस्यासन् परार्थैकफला गुणाः R.1.29 for the good of others; अर्थान- र्थावुभौ बुद्ध्वा Ms.8.24 good and evil; क्षेत्रिणामर्थः 9.52; यावानर्थ उदपाने सर्वतः सांप्लुतोदके Bg.2.46; also व्यर्थ, निरर्थक q. v. (b) Use, want, need, concern, with instr.; को$र्थः पुत्रेण जातेन Pt.1 what is the use of a son being born; कश्च तेनार्थः Dk.59; को$र्थस्तिरश्चां गुणैः Pt.2.33 what do brutes care for merits; Bh.2.48; योग्येनार्थः कस्य न स्याज्ज- नेन Ś.18.66; नैव तस्य कृतेनार्थो नाकृतेनेह कश्चन Bg.3.18; यदि प्राणैरिहार्थो वो निवर्तध्वम् Rām. को नु मे जीवितेनार्थः Nala.12. 65.
    -9 Asking, begging; request, suit, petition.
    -1 Action, plaint (in law); अर्थ विरागाः पश्यन्ति Rām.2.1. 58; असाक्षिकेषु त्वर्थेषु Ms.8.19.
    -11 The actual state, fact of the matter; as in यथार्थ, अर्थतः, ˚तत्वविद्, यदर्थेन विनामुष्य पुंस आत्मविपर्ययः Bhāg.3.7.1.
    -12 Manner, kind, sort.
    -13 Prevention, warding off; मशकार्थो धूमः; prohibition, abolition (this meaning may also be derived from 1 above).
    -14 Price (perhaps an incorrect form for अर्घ).
    -15 Fruit, result (फलम्). तस्य नानुभवेदर्थं यस्य हेतोः स रोपितः Rām.6.128.7; Mb.12.175.5.
    -16 N. of a son of धर्म.
    -17 The second place from the लग्न (in astr.).
    -18 N. of Viṣṇu.
    -19 The category called अपूर्व (in पूर्वमीमांसा); अर्थ इति अपूर्वं ब्रूमः । ŚB. on MS.7.1.2.
    -2 Force (of a statement or an expres- sion); अर्थाच्च सामर्थ्याच्च क्रमो विधीयते । ŚB. on MS.5.1.2. [अर्थात् = by implication].
    -21 The need, purpose, sense; व्यवधानादर्थो बलीयान् । ŚB. on MS.6.4.23.
    -22 Capacity, power; अर्थाद्वा कल्पनैकदेशत्वात् । Ms.1.4.3 (where Śabara paraphrases अर्थात् by सामर्थ्यात् and states the rule: आख्यातानामर्थं ब्रुवतां शक्तिः सहकारिणी ।), cf. अर्थो$भिधेयरैवस्तुप्रयोजननिवृत्तिषु । मोक्षकारणयोश्च...... Nm.
    -Comp. -अतिदेशः Extension (of gender, number &e.) to the objects (as against words), i. e. to treat a single object as though it were many, a female as though it were male. (तन्त्रवार्त्तिक 1.2.58.3;6.3.34.7).
    -अधिकारः charge of money, office of treasurer ˚रे न नियोक्तव्यौ H.2.
    -अधिकारिन् m. a treasurer, one charged with finan- cial duties, finance minister.
    -अनुपपत्तिः f. The difficulty of accounting for or explaining satisfactorily a particular meaning; incongruity of a particular meaning (तन्त्रवार्त्तिक 4.3.42.2).
    -अनुयायिन् a. Following the rules (शास्त्र); तत्त्रिकालहितं वाक्यं धर्म्यमर्थानुयायि च Rām.5.51.21.
    -अन्वेषणम् inquiry after a matter.
    -अन्तरम् 1 another or different meaning.
    -2 another cause or motive; अर्थो$यम- र्थान्तरभाव्य एव Ku.3.18.
    -3 A new matter or circum- stance, new affair.
    -4 opposite or antithetical meaning, difference of meaning. ˚न्यासः a figure of speech in which a general proposition is adduced to support a particular instance, or a particular instance, to support a general proposition; it is an inference from parti- cular to general and vice versa; उक्तिरर्थान्तरन्यासः स्यात् सामान्यविशेषयोः । (1) हनूमानब्धिमतरद् दुष्करं किं महात्मनाम् ॥ (2) गुणवद्वस्तुसंसर्गाद्याति नीचो$पि गौरवम् । पुष्पमालानुषङ्गेण सूत्रं शिरसि धार्यते Kuval.; cf. also K. P.1 and S. D.79. (Ins- tances of this figure abound in Sanskrit literature, especi- ally in the works of Kālidāsa, Māgha and Bhāravi).
    -अन्वित a.
    1 rich, wealthy.
    -2 significant.
    -अभिधान a.
    1 That whose name is connected with the purpose to be served by it; अर्थाभिधानं प्रयोजनसम्बद्धमभिधानं यस्य, यथा पुरोडाश- कपालमिति पुरोडाशार्थं कपालं पुरोडाशकपालम् । ŚB. on MS.4.1. 26.
    -2 Expression or denotation of the desired meaning (वार्त्तिक 3.1.2.5.).
    -अर्थिन् a. one who longs for or strives to get wealth or gain any object. अर्थार्थी जीवलोको$यम् । आर्तो जिज्ञासुरर्थार्थी Bg.7.16.
    -अलंकरः a figure of speech determined by and dependent on the sense, and not on sound (opp. शब्दालंकार). अलंकारशेखर of केशवमिश्र mentions (verse 29) fourteen types of अर्थालंकारs as follows:- उपमारूपकोत्प्रेक्षाः समासोक्तिरपह्नुतिः । समाहितं स्वभावश्च विरोधः सारदीपकौ ॥ सहोक्तिरन्यदेशत्वं विशेषोक्तिर्विभावना । एवं स्युरर्थालकारा- श्चतुर्दश न चापरे ॥
    -आगमः 1 acquisition of wealth, income; ˚गमाय स्यात् Pt.1. cf. also अर्थागमो नित्यमरोगिता च H.
    -2 collection of property.
    -3 conveying of sense; S. D.737.
    -आपत्तिः f. [अर्थस्य अनुक्तार्थस्य आपत्तिः सिद्धिः]
    1 an inference from circumstances, presumption, im- plication, one of the five sources of knowledge or modes of proof, according to the Mīmāṁsakas. It is 'deduc- tion of a matter from that which could not else be'; it is 'assumption of a thing, not itself perceived but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proved'; it is an inference used to account for an apparent inconsistency; as in the familiar instance पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते the apparent inconsistency between 'fatness' and 'not eating by day' is accounted for by the inference of his 'eating by night'. पीनत्वविशि- ष्टस्य देवदत्तस्य रात्रिभोजित्वरूपार्थस्य शब्दानुक्तस्यापि आपत्तिः. It is defined by Śabara as दृष्टः श्रुतो वार्थो$न्यथा नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थ- कल्पना । यथा जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना ॥ Ms.1.1.5. It may be seen from the words दृष्टः and श्रुतः in the above definition, that Śabara has sug- gested two varieties of अर्थापत्ति viz. दृष्टार्थापत्ति and श्रुता- र्थापत्ति. The illustration given by him, however, is of दृष्टार्थापत्ति only. The former i. e. दृष्टार्थापत्ति consists in the presumption of some अदृष्ट अर्थ to account for some दृष्ट अर्थ (or अर्थs) which otherwise becomes inexplicable. The latter, on the other hand, consists in the presump- tion of some अर्थ through अश्रुत शब्द to account for some श्रुत अर्थ (i. e. some statement). This peculiarity of श्रुतार्थापत्ति is clearly stated in the following couplet; यत्र त्वपरिपूर्णस्य वाक्यस्यान्वयसिद्धये । शब्दो$ध्याह्रियते तत्र श्रुतार्थापत्ति- रिष्यते ॥ Mānameyodaya p.129 (ed. by K. Raja, Adyar, 1933). Strictly speaking it is no separate mode of proof; it is only a case of अनुमान and can be proved by a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति; cf. Tarka. K.17 and S. D.46.
    -2 a figure of speech (according to some rhe- toricians) in which a relevant assertion suggests an inference not actually connected with the the subject in hand, or vice versa; it corresponds to what is popularly called कैमुतिकन्याय or दण्डापूपन्याय; e. g. हारो$यं हरिणाक्षीणां लुण्ठति स्तनमण्डले । मुक्तानामप्यवस्थेयं के वयं स्मरकिङ्कराः Amaru.1; अभितप्तमयो$पि मार्दवं भजते कैव कथा शरीरिषु R.8.43.; S. D. thus defines the figure:- दण्डापूपिकन्यायार्थागमो$र्थापत्तिरिष्यते.
    -उत्पत्तिः f. acquisition of wealth; so ˚उपार्जनम्.
    -उपक्षेपकः an introductory scene (in dramas); अर्थोपक्षेपकाः पञ्च S. D.38. They are विष्कम्भ, चूलिका, अङ्कास्य, अङ्कावतार, प्रवेशक.
    -उपमा a simile dependent on sense and not on sound; see under उपमा.
    -उपार्जनम् Acquiring wealth.
    -उष्मन् m. the glow or warmth of wealth; अर्थोष्मणा विरहितः पुरुषः स एव Bh.2.4.
    -ओघः, -राशिः treasure, hoard of money.
    -कर (
    -री f.),
    -कृत a.
    1 bringing in wealth, enriching; अर्थकरी च विद्या H. Pr.3.
    -2 useful, advan- tageous.
    -कर्मन् n.
    1 a principal action (opp. गुणकर्मन्).
    -2 (as opposed to प्रतिपत्तिकर्मन्), A fruitful act (as opposed to mere disposal or प्रतिपत्ति); अर्थकर्म वा कर्तृ- संयोगात् स्रग्वत् । MS.4.2.17.
    -काम a. desirous of wealth. (-˚मौ dual), wealth and (sensual) desire or pleasure; अप्यर्थकामौ तस्यास्तां धर्म एव मनीषिणः R.1.25. ह्रत्वार्थकामास्तु गुरूनिहैव Bg.2.5.
    -कार्ष्यम् Poverty. निर्बन्धसंजातरुषार्थकार्घ्यमचिन्तयित्वा गुरुणाहमुक्तः R.5.21.
    -काशिन् a. Only apparently of utility (not really).
    -किल्बिषिन् a. dishonest in money-matters.
    -कृच्छ्रम् 1 a difficult matter.
    -2 pecuniary difficulty; व्यसनं वार्थकृच्छ्रे वा Rām.4.7.9; Mb.3.2.19; cf. also Kau. A.1.15 न मुह्येदर्थकृच्छ्रेषु Nīti.
    -कृत्यम् doing or execution of a business; अभ्युपेतार्थकृत्याः Me.4.
    -कोविद a. Expert in a matter, experienced. उवाच रामो धर्मात्मा पुनरप्यर्थकोविदः Rām.6.4.8.
    -क्रमः due order or sequ- ence of purpose.
    -क्रिया (a) An implied act, an act which is to be performed as a matter of course (as opposed to शब्दोक्तक्रिया); असति शब्दोक्ते अर्थक्रिया भवति ŚB. on MS.12.1.12. (b) A purposeful action. (see अर्थकर्मन्).
    -गत a.
    1 based on the sense (as a दोष).
    -2 devoid of sense.
    -गतिः understanding the sense.
    -गुणाः cf. भाविकत्वं सुशब्दत्वं पर्यायोक्तिः सुधर्मिता । चत्वारो$र्थगुणाः प्रोक्ताः परे त्वत्रैव संगताः ॥ अलंकारशेखर 21.
    -गृहम् A treasury. Hariv.
    -गौरवम् depth of meaning; भारवेरर्थगौरवम् Udb., Ki.2.27.
    -घ्न a. (
    घ्नी f.) extrava- gant, wasteful, prodigal; सुरापी व्याधिता धूर्ता वन्ध्यार्थघ्न्य- प्रियंवदा Y.1.73; व्याधिता वाधिवेत्तव्या हिंस्रार्थघ्नी च सर्वदा Ms.9.8.
    -चित्रम् 'variety in sense', a pun, Kāvya- prakāśa.
    -चिन्तक a.
    1 thinking of profit.
    -2 having charge of affairs; सर्वार्थचिन्तकः Ms.7.121.
    -चिन्ता, -चिन्तनम् charge or administration of (royal) affairs; मन्त्री स्यादर्थचिन्तायाम् S. D.
    -जात a.
    1 full of meaning.
    -2 wealthy (जातधन).
    (-तम्) 1 a collection of things.
    -2 large amount of wealth, considerable property; Dk.63, Ś.6; ददाति च नित्यमर्थजातम् Mk.2.7.
    -3 all matters; कवय इव महीपाश्चिन्तयन्त्यर्थजातम् Śi.11.6.
    -4 its own meaning; वहन्द्वयीं यद्यफले$र्थजाते Ki.3.48.
    -ज्ञ a. knowing the sense or purpose; अर्थज्ञ इत्सकलं भद्रमश्नुते Nir.
    -तत्त्वम् 1 the real truth, the fact of the matter; यो$र्थतत्त्वमविज्ञाय क्रोधस्यैव वशं गतः H.4.94.
    -2 the real nature or cause of anything.
    -द a.
    1 yielding wealth; Dk.41.
    -2 advantageous, productive of good, useful.
    -3 liberal, munificent Ms.2.19.
    -4 favour- able, compliant. (
    -दः) N. of Kubera.
    -दर्शकः 'one who sees law-suits'; a judge.
    -दर्शनम् perception of objects; कुरुते दीप इवार्थदर्शनम् Ki.2.33; Dk.155.
    -दूषणम् 1 extravagance, waste; H.3.18; Ms.7.48.
    -2 unjust seizure of property or withholding what is due.
    -3 finding fault with the meaning.
    -4 spoiling of another's property.
    -दृश् f. Consideration of truth; क्षेमं त्रिलोकगुरुरर्थदृशं च यच्छन् Bhāg.1.86.21.
    -दृष्टिः Seeing profit; Bhāg.
    -दोषः a literary fault or blemish with regard to the sense, one of the four doṣas or blemishes of literary composition, the other three being परदोष, पदांशदोष, वाक्यदोष; for definitions &c. see K. P.7. अलंकारशेखर of केशवमिश्र who mentions eight types of doṣas as follows: अष्टार्थदोषाः विरस, -ग्राम्य, -व्याहत, -खिन्नताः । -हीना, -धिका, सदृक्साम्यं देशादीनां विरोधि च ॥ 17
    -द्वयविधानम् Injunction of two ideas or senses; विधाने चार्थद्वयविधानं दोषः ŚB. on MS.1.8.7.
    -नित्य a. = अर्थ- प्रधान Nir.
    -निबन्धन a. dependent on wealth.
    -निश्चयः determination, decision.
    -प्रतिः 1 'the lord of riches', a a king; किंचिद् विहस्यार्थपतिं बभाषे R.2.46;1.59;9.3;18.1; Pt.1.74.
    -2 an epithet of Kubera.
    -पदम् N. of the Vārt. on Pāṇini; ससूत्रवृत्त्यर्थपदं महार्थं ससंग्रहं सिद्ध्यति वै कपीन्द्रः Rām.7.36.45.
    -पर, -लुब्ध a.
    1 intent on gaining wealth, greedy of wealth, covetous.
    -2 niggardly, parsimonious; हिंस्रा दयालुरपि चार्थपरा वदान्या Bh.2.47; Pt.1.425.
    -प्रकृतिः f. the leading source or occasion of the grand object in a drama; (the number of these 'sources' is five:-- बीजं बिन्दुः पताका च प्रकरी कार्यमेव च । अर्थप्रकृतयः पञ्च ज्ञात्वा योज्या यथाविधि S. D.317.)
    -प्रयोगः 1 usury.
    -2 administration of the affairs (of a state)
    -प्राप्त a. derived or understood from the sense included as a matter of course, implied; परिसमाप्तिः शब्दार्थः । परिसमाप्त्यामर्थप्राप्तत्वादारम्भस्य । ŚB. on MS.6.2.13.
    -˚त्वम् Inplication.
    -बन्धः 1 arrange- ment of words, composition, text; stanza, verse; संचिन्त्य गीतक्षममर्थबन्धम् Ś.7.5; ललितार्थबन्धम् V.2.14 put or expressed in elegant words.
    -2. connection (of the soul) with the objects of sense.
    -बुद्धि a. selfish.
    -बोधः indication of the (real) import.
    -भाज् a. entitled to a share in the division of property.
    -भावनम् Delibera- tion over a subject (Pātañjala Yogadarśana 1.28).
    -भृत् a. receiving high wages (as a servant).
    -भेदः distinc- tion or difference of meaning; अर्थभेदेन शब्दभेदः.
    -मात्रम्, -त्रा 1 property, wealth; Pt.2.
    -2 the whole sense or object.
    -युक्त a. significant, full of यस्यार्थयुक्तं meaning; गिरिराजशब्दं कुर्वन्ति Ku.1.13.
    -लक्षण a. As determined by the purpose or need (as opposed to शब्दलक्षण); लोके कर्मार्थलक्षणम् Ms.11.1.26.
    -लाभः acquisition of wealth.
    -लोभः avarice.
    -वशः power in the form of discrimination and knowledge. अर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् Sāvk.65.
    -वादः 1 declaration of any purpose.
    -2 affirmation, declaratory assertion, an explanatory remark, exegesis; speech or assertion having a certain object; a sentence. (It usually recommends a विधि or precept by stating the good arising from its proper observance, and the evils arising from its omission, and also by adducing historical instances in its support; स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इत्यर्थवादः Gaut. Sūt.; said by Laugākṣi to be of 3 kinds:- गुणवादो विरोधे स्यादनु वादो$वधारिते । भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानादर्थ- वादस्त्रिधा मतः; the last kind includes many varieties.)
    -3 one of the six means of finding out the tātparya (real aim and object) of any work.
    -4 praise, eulogy; अर्थवाद एषः । दोषं तु मे कंचित्कथय U.1.
    -विकरणम् = अर्थ- विक्रिया change of meaning.
    -विकल्पः 1 deviation from truth, perversion of fact.
    -2 prevarication; also ˚वैकल्प्यम्
    -विज्ञानम् comprehending the sense, one of the six exercises of the understanding (धीगुण).
    -विद् a. sensible, wise, sagacious. भुङ्क्ते तदपि तच्चान्यो मधुहेवार्थविन्मधु Bhāg.11.18.15. विवक्षतामर्थविदस्तत्क्षणप्रतिसंहृताम् Śi.
    -विद्या knowledge of practical life; Mb.7.
    -विपत्तिः Failing of an aim; समीक्ष्यतां चार्थविपत्तिमार्गताम् Rām.2.19.4.
    -विभावक a. money-giver; विप्रेभ्यो$र्थविभावकः Mb.3.33. 84.
    -विप्रकर्षः difficulty in the comprehension of the sense.
    -विशेषणम् a reprehensive repetition of something uttered by another; S. D.49.
    -वृद्धिः f. accumulation of wealth.
    -व्ययः expenditure; ˚ज्ञ a. conversant with money-matters.
    -शब्दौ Word and sense.
    -शालिन् a. Wealthy.
    -शास्त्रम् 1 the science of wealth (political economy).
    -2 science of polity, political science, politics; अर्थशास्त्रविशारदं सुधन्वानमुपाध्यायम् Rām.2.1.14. Dk.12; इह खलु अर्थशास्त्रकारास्त्रिविधां सिद्धिमुपवर्णयन्ति Mu.3; ˚व्यवहारिन् one dealing with politics, a politician; Mu.5.
    -3 science giving precepts on general conduct, the science of practical life; Pt.1.
    -शौचम् purity or honesty in money-matters; सर्वेषां चैव शौचानामर्थशौचं परं स्मृतं Ms. 5.16.
    -श्री Great wealth.
    -संस्थानम् 1 accumulation of wealth.
    -2 treasury.
    -संग्रहः, -संचयः accumulation or acquisition of wealth, treasure, property. कोशेनाश्रयणी- यत्वमिति तस्यार्थसंग्रहः R.17.6. कुदेशमासाद्य कुतो$र्थसंचयः H.
    -संग्रहः a book on Mīmāṁsā by Laugākṣi Bhāskara.
    -सतत्त्वम् truth; किं पुनरत्रार्थसतत्त्वम् । देवा ज्ञातुमर्हन्ति MBh. or P.VIII.3.72.
    -समाजः aggregate of causes.
    -समाहारः 1 treasure.
    -2 acquisition of wealth.
    -संपद् f. accomplishment of a desired object; उपेत्य संघर्ष- मिवार्थसंपदः Ki.1.15.
    -संपादनम् Carrying out of an affair; Ms.7.168.
    -संबन्धः connection of the sense with the word or sentence.
    -संबन्धिन् a. Concerned or interested in an affair; Ms.8.64.
    -साधक a.
    1 accomplishing any object.
    -2 bringing any matter to a conclusion.
    -सारः considerable wealth; Pt.2.42.
    -सिद्ध a. understood from the very context (though not expressed in words), inferable from the connection of words.
    -सिद्धिः f. fulfilment of a desired object, success. द्वारमिवार्थसिद्धेः R.2.21.
    -हानिः Loss of wealth
    -हारिन् a. stealing money Ks.
    -हर a. inheriting wealth.
    -हीन a.
    1 deprived of wealth, poor.
    -2 unmeaning, nonsensical.
    -3 failing.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > अर्थः _arthḥ

  • 14 wavelet

    Ex. The author discusses image-data compression results based on the new inference algorithm alone and in combination with wavelets.
    * * *

    Ex: The author discusses image-data compression results based on the new inference algorithm alone and in combination with wavelets.

    Spanish-English dictionary > wavelet

  • 15 निर्णयः _nirṇayḥ

    निर्णयः 1 Removing, removal.
    -2 Complete ascertain- ment, decision, affirmation, determination, settlement; संदेहनिर्णयो जातः Ś.1.27; Ms.8.31,49;9.25; Y.2.1; हृदयं निर्णयमेव धावति Ki.2.29.
    -3 Deduction, inference, conclusion, demonstration (in logic).
    -4 Discussion, investigation, consideration
    -5 Sentence, verdict, judgment; बाहुवीर्याश्रिते मार्गे वर्तसे दीप्तनिर्णये Mb. 3.292.2; सर्वज्ञस्याप्येकाकिनो निर्णयाभ्युपगमो दोषाय M.1.
    -6 Application of a conclusive argument.
    -7 (In Rhet.) Narration of events.
    -Comp. -उपमा a. comparison based upon an inference; Kāv.2.27.
    -पादः a sentence, decree, verdict (in law).

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > निर्णयः _nirṇayḥ

  • 16 निर्णय


    nirṇaya

    nir-ṇaya
    m. taking off, removing Mn. MBh. Kāv. etc.;

    complete ascertainment, decision, determination, settlement ib. ;
    (in logic) deduction, inference, conclusion, demonstration;
    application of a conclusive argument;
    (in law) sentence, verdict (cf. - pāda below);
    (in rhet.) narration of events Sāh. ;
    discussion, consideration (= vicāra) L. ;
    -kamalâ̱kara m. - kaumudī f. - kaustubha m. orﾠ n. - candrikā f. - tattva n. - taraṇi m. orﾠ f. - darpaṇa m. - dīpa andﾠ - paka m. - pikā f. N. of wks.;
    - pāda m. the fourth ( andﾠ last) part of a lawsuit, sentence, decree, verdict L. ;
    - bindu m. - bhāskara m. - mañjarī f. - ratna n. - ratna-dīpikā f. -ratnâ̱kara m. - vivaraṇa n. - saṉgraha m. - samudāya m. - sāra m. -siddhâ̱nta m. - sindhu m. yâ̱mṛita n. -yâ̱rṇava m. -yâ̱rtha-pradīpa m. - yôddhāra m. N. of wks.;
    - yôpamā f. a comparison based upon an inference Kāvyâd. II, 27.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > निर्णय

  • 17 Bibliography

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     ■ Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
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     ■ Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive psychology and its implications (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Archilochus (1971). In M. L. West (Ed.), Iambi et elegi graeci (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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     ■ Atkins, P. W. (1992). Creation revisited. Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Company.
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     ■ Bacon, R. (1928). Opus majus (Vol. 2). R. B. Burke (Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
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     ■ Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.
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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 18 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 19 вывод на знаниях

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > вывод на знаниях

  • 20 вывод

    conclusion, deduction, inference, derivation
    • Второй метод вывода уравнения (1) формулируется следующим образом. - A second method of obtaining (1) is as follows.
    • Вывод из всего этого состоит в том, что... - The outcome of all this is that...
    • Другой способ вывода этих формул основан на... - Another way of deriving these formulas is based on...
    • Заметьте, что этот вывод не ограничен (чем-л). - Notice that this derivation is not restricted to...
    • Из данного обсуждения не следует делать вывод, что... -It should not be inferred from this discussion that...
    • Из способа вывода данного уравнения будет видно, что... - From the way in which this equation has been obtained, it will be seen that...
    • Можно сделать вывод, что... - It may be concluded that...; It may be deduced that...
    • Относительно строгого вывода соотношения (12) читатель должен обратиться к работе Смита [1]. - For a rigorous derivation of (12) the reader is referred to Smith [1].
    • Подробный вывод показал бы, что... - A detailed derivation would show that...
    • Полный вывод дается Джонсом [1]. - The derivation is given in full by Jones [1].
    • Похоже, что неизбежно напрашивается вывод о том, что... - There seemed no escaping the conclusion that...
    • Практическим выводом (из этого) является то, что... - The practical implication is that...
    • При выводе большинства этих свойств отправной точкой служит наблюдение, что... - In establishing most of these properties the starting point is the observation that...
    • При выводе данного уравнения мы использовали тот важный факт, что... - In deriving the above equation we have used the important fact that...
    • Результат, представленный формулой (9), очень полезен при выводе свойств (чего-л). - The result (9) is very useful for deducing properties of...
    • Формальный вывод (соотношения, уравнения и т. п.) дается ниже. - A formal derivation is given below.
    • Формальный вывод (этого соотношения) приводится во втором параграфе. - A formal derivation is given in Section 2.
    (= выводу), мы... - То arrive at a definite conclusion, we...
    • Эти два вывода совместно показывают, что... - These two results together show that...
    • Это приводит к выводу, что... - This carries the implication that...
    • Этот вывод (формулы) должен быть тщательно исследован, потому что... - The derivation should be studied closely because...

    Русско-английский словарь научного общения > вывод

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См. также в других словарях:

  • Inference — is the act or process of deriving a conclusion based solely on what one already knows. Inference is studied within several different fields. * Human inference (i.e. how humans draw conclusions) is traditionally studied within the field of… …   Wikipedia

  • inference — 1 deduction, conclusion, judgment (see under INFER) 2 Inference, ratiocination denote the process of arriving at conclusions from data or premises. Inference often connotes guesswork based on trivial or inadequate data or premises; in technical… …   New Dictionary of Synonyms

  • Inference engine — In computer science, and specifically the branches of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence, an inference engine is a computer program that tries to derive answers from a knowledge base. It is the brain that expert systems use to… …   Wikipedia

  • inference — noun ADJECTIVE ▪ fair, logical, reasonable, valid ▪ obvious VERB + INFERENCE ▪ draw, make …   Collocations dictionary

  • inference */ — UK [ˈɪnf(ə)rəns] / US [ˈɪnfərəns] noun Word forms inference : singular inference plural inferences a) [countable] an opinion that you form about something that is based on information you already have inference from: It s impossible to make… …   English dictionary

  • inference — /in feuhr euhns, freuhns/, n. 1. the act or process of inferring. 2. something that is inferred: to make rash inferences. 3. Logic. a. the process of deriving the strict logical consequences of assumed premises. b. the process of arriving at some …   Universalium

  • inference — in|fer|ence [ ınfərəns ] noun * count an opinion you form about something that is based on information you already have: inference from: It s impossible to make inferences from such a small sample. make/draw inferences: They hope to draw… …   Usage of the words and phrases in modern English

  • inference — in|fer|ence [ˈınfərəns] n 1.) something that you think is true, based on information that you have draw/make inferences (about/from sth) ▪ What inferences have you drawn from this evidence? 2.) [U] when someone infers something by inference ▪ He… …   Dictionary of contemporary English

  • inference — noun 1 (C) something that you think is true, based on information that you already know: draw inferences: What inferences have you drawn from this evidence? 2 (U) the act of inferring something: by inference: measures directed against the enemies …   Longman dictionary of contemporary English

  • inference on inference, rule of — Means that one presumption or inference may not be based upon another. McManimen v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 317 Ill.App. 649, 47 N.E.2d 385 …   Black's law dictionary

  • inference on inference, rule of — Means that one presumption or inference may not be based upon another. McManimen v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 317 Ill.App. 649, 47 N.E.2d 385 …   Black's law dictionary

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